In this work, we propose the first post-quantum UC-commitment scheme in the Global Random Oracle Model, where only one non-programmable random oracle is available. The security of our proposal is based on two well-established post-quantum hardness assumptions from coding theory: The Syndrome Decoding and the Goppa Distinguisher. We prove that our proposal is perfectly hiding and computationally binding. The scheme is secure against static malicious adversaries.
Introduction
One of the most important cryptographic primitive in today's world are commitment schemes, both in theory and in practice. A commitment scheme involves two parties, usually called the committer C and the receiver R. C commits to a message and sends the commitment to R. Later, C may open the commitment and reveal the message to R, which checks if the opening is a valid one. Two security properties are required for this primitive: the hiding property, which means that R is not able to extract information about the message from the commitment before the opening phase, and the binding property, which means that C cannot open a different message from the one it has committed before.
This simple, yet powerful, primitive has found numerous applications such as zero-knowledge proofs, signature schemes, secure multi-party computation, e-voting or, even, key-exchange. Due to its versatility, a commitment scheme should be secure, not just per se, but also when composed with the same or other protocols. Hence, security of commitment should be analyzed in the UCframework [Can01] , where security under arbitrary composition can be proven.
Commitment schemes can be obtained from oblivious transfer (OT) via a generic compiler [Kil88] . However, the resulting commitment scheme is too inefficient for practical purposes since it requires a large number of OT executions. From a practical perspective, explicit constructions for commitment schemes are more interesting since they are designed to be more efficient than generic transformations.
As far as we know, all the explicit constructions for UC-commitment schemes have their security based on number-theoretic hardness assumptions (e.g., [CF01, Lin11, CJS14] ) and, thus, they can be broken using Shor's algorithm [Sho97] . With the growing interest in quantum technologies and as we enter the postquantum era, it becomes crucial to find post-quantum alternatives to this type of protocols.
In this work, we address this problem by presenting the first explicit construction for a post-quantum UC-commitment scheme. Our proposal is proven to be secure in the Global Random Oracle (gRO) model [CJS14] . We prove that our scheme is perfectly hiding (meaning that even a receiver with unlimited computational power cannot break the hiding property) and computationally binding given that the Syndrome Decoding (SD) and the Goppa Distinguisher (GD) assumptions hold.
Previous work
Commitment schemes. There is a large amount of work done concerning UC-commitment schemes [CF01, DN02, HMQ04, Lin11, FLM11, CJS14, Fuj16, BPRS17] . However, all of these protocols are based on number-theoretic assumptions. Thus, their security is threatened, since Shor's quantum algorithm breaks all of these protocols [Sho97] .
A UC-commitment scheme must allow extraction and equivocation by the simulator. These properties are essential to perform the simulation and to prove security in the UC-framework [CF01] . All of the schemes mentioned above take advantage of the nice properties inherent to number-theoretic assumptions to be able to extract and equivocate.
1 However, it seems that most of the techniques used in these schemes cannot be straightforwardly adapted using post-quantum assumptions. Thus, the task of explicitly constructing a postquantum commitment scheme that is both extractable and equivocable is highly non-trivial.
Post-quantum commitment schemes exist, e.g., [JKPT12] , based on the LPN assumption, and [XXW13] , based on the RLWE assumption. However, we are not aware of any commitment scheme based on post-quantum assumptions and proven to be secure in the UC-framework.
We remark that commitment schemes can also be obtained from OT [Kil88, GIKW14] , and for which there are UC-secure post-quantum proposals (e.g., [PVW08, BDD + 17, BDGM18]). However, the resulting commitment scheme is too inefficient and it just has theoretical value.
UC-commitment schemes are used as building block in the design of a wide range of applications, and they are known to imply key-exchange [DG03] and general forms of secure two and multi-party computation [CLOS02] . Global random oracle model. As it is well-known, it is impossible to design UC-commitment schemes in the plain model [CF01] , thus we work on the Global Random Oracle (gRO) Model. The gRO Model is a more realistic model where only one global random oracle is available for every party in every execution of the same, or other, protocol. The notion of a gRO was firstly introduced in [CJS14] to overcome the fact that proofs in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) [BR93] assume a different random oracle for each execution of the protocol. Hence, security under composition may not be guaranteed when we replace the random oracles by a practical cryptographic hash function (which is usually the same for every execution of every protocol).
The main difference between the gRO Model and the ROM is that, in the gRO Model, we restrict the observability and the programmability power of the simulator. More precisely, the simulator is restricted to observe only adversarial queries (queries made by an adversary and not by a honest party) and it is not allowed to program the random oracle. Observe that, if the simulator can program the random oracle, then we can not use the same random oracle in other executions of the same or other protocols. If we do so, an environment could distinguish the ideal and the real world executions by just asking the same queries in two different executions of the protocol, for example. Also, note that we cannot restrict completely the power of the simulator to observe queries. If we do so, the simulator has the same power of the parties involved in the protocol and cannot perform the simulation necessary for security proofs [CJS14] (at least, in the case of commitment schemes [CDG + 18]). Hence, the simulator is given only the power to observe queries made by an adversary (but not by a honest party).
By using this security model, the discrepancy between the abstract model and the practical usage of a protocol is softened, since we can just replace calls to the gRO by calls to a global cryptographic hash function. This model was also studied in [CDG + 18], where it was called the restricted Observable Global Random Oracle Model.
Protocols proven to be UC-secure in the gRO Model include number-theoretic OT and commitment schemes [CJS14, BPRS17] , and a two-party computation scheme [CJS14] . Recall that an UC-commitment scheme should allow extractability and equivocability by a simulator. The scheme of [CJS14] uses a trapdoor version of the Pedersen commitment scheme to achieve equivocation. However, as far as we know, there is no post-quantum analogue of this trapdoor version of Pedersen commitment. Hence, we have to follow a different strategy.
Outline of the protocol
The main contribution of this paper is the construction of a post-quantum UC-commitment scheme. As far as we know, this is the first post-quantum commitment scheme proven to be secure in the UC-framework, in the gRO Model.
As mentioned before, to achieve UC-security for the commitment scheme, we have to construct a commitment scheme such that the simulator in the ideal-world execution is able to extract the committed message from a corrupted committer and it is able to equivocate a commitment. In our scheme, the committer C queries the gRO on an input that contains the message and this allows for extractability. On the other hand, equivocation is possible due to the use of a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge (ZKPoK) with the honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) property.
More precisely, let B be a public random matrix. The receiver R starts by sending a matrix A together with the hash of a trapdoor for it. C commits to its message M by computing c 1 = r 1 A+gRO(M, t)+e 1 and c 2 = gRO(r 1 , M, t)A+ r 2 B + e 2 where r 1 and r 2 are random vectors and e 1 and e 2 are error vectors. We can already see that the simulator is able to extract the message by looking at the queries to gRO and finding the ones that fulfill the conditions.
To open a message, C opens r 1 , M, t. Then both C and R engage in a ZKPoK [JKPT12] where C proves that it has a witness for public information c 2 − gRO(r 1 , M, t)A. In order for the simulator to equivocate in this phase of the protocol, it extracts the trapdoor for A and finds another r 1 such that c 1 −(r 1 A+gRO(M , t )) has low Hamming weight. This can be done on polynomial time for certain classes of codes and for an appropriate choice of parameters (e.g. [CFS01] ). Now, the simulator must prove that it has a secret for public information c 2 −gRO(r 1 , M , t )A (which it does not have). We make R to commit to the challenge of the ZKPoK using gRO before C sends the first message of the ZKPoK. In this way, the simulator knows which is the challenge that R is going to ask and can cheat in the protocol, using the HVZK property of the ZKPoK. This technique is similar to the one used in [Lin11] . However, since the scheme of [Lin11] is proven in the CRS model, a dual-mode encryption scheme [PVW08] is used as a commitment scheme (for technical reasons), while in our scheme, it is enough to use the gRO as a commitment scheme.
We prove that the scheme is perfectly hiding and computationally binding. We also prove security against static malicious adversaries in the UC-framework, in the gRO Model.
Since we base the security of our scheme in well-established code-based assumptions, namely the SD and the GD assumptions, our protocol is considered to be post-quantum and it is the first explicit construction for UC-commitment that has this property.
Preliminaries
We denote matrices by capital bold letters (e.g., A) and vectors by bold lowercase letters (e.g., v). If S is a finite set, |S| denotes its cardinality and x ←$ S denotes the experiment of choosing an element x uniformly at random from S. If A is an algorithm, y ← A(x) denotes the experiment of running A on input x and setting the output to be y. If x is a vector, w(x) denotes its Hamming weight, that is, the number of coordinates of x which are different from zero. If A is a matrix, we denote its transpose by A T . A k-dimensional binary (linear) code C of length n is defined by its generating
k×n , that is,
or by its parity-check matrix H ∈ {0, 1} (n−k)×n , that is,
The generating and parity-check matrices fulfill the condition HA T = 0. Throughout this work, let B n =ω = {e ∈ {0, 1} n : w(e) = ω} and B n ≤ω = {e ∈ {0, 1} n : w(e) ≤ ω}. In the description of the protocols, we denote by x = ? y the experiment of testing if x and y are equal. If they are not, then the party executing the experiment aborts the protocol.
A PPT algorithm means a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm.
Hardness assumptions in coding theory
We present the Syndrome Decoding (SD) problem, which states that it is hard to decode a linear code chosen uniformly at random. The problem is proven to be NP-complete in the worst-case [BMvT78] .
The SD problem is a classical problem in coding theory and, by now, it is a well-established problem in code-based cryptography. Although no worst-case to average-case reduction is known, it is widely believed that, for an appropriate choice of parameters, the problem is hard for any random instance since the best known classical and quantum attacks still run in exponential time (e.g. [BJMM12, EKM17, Kir18] ).
The following problem is a particular case of the SD problem, which was presented in [JKPT12] .
Definition 2 (Exact Learning Parity with Noise
k×n and e ←$ B n =ω . The decisional version of the xLPN τ problem is (n, ε)-hard if for every PPT algorithm D we have
n . The search version of the xLPN τ,k problem is (n, ε)-hard if for every PPT algorithm D we have
It is easy to see that the xLPN is a particular case of the SD problem, that is, if we are able to solve the SD ω,n problem then we are able to solve the xLPN τ,n , where ω = τ n .
The proof of knowledge of [JKPT12] . Recall that a sigma protocol is a three-round protocol (commitment com, challenge ch and response resp) between two parties, a prover P and a verifier V. P tries to convince V that some statement is true. A zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge (ZKPoK) is a sigma protocol where P, not only proves that the statement is true, but also proves that it has a witness for it. Figure 1 presents a scheme of any sigma protocol.
resp ← P2(x, w; com, ch) resp V2(x, com, ch, resp) = ? 1 Figure 1 : Sigma protocol structure. The value x is public information and w is usually called the witness. Let ∼ be a relation and R = {(x, w) : x ∼ w}. A transcript T = (com, ch, resp) is the tuple of messages exchange and we say that it is valid when V 2 (x, T ) = 1.
Besides being correct and special sound, a ZKPoK should also be honestverifier zero-knowledge (HVZK). This property ensures that no information is gained by V by looking at a valid transcript. This is usually proved by showing the existence of a simulator that can generate transcripts that are computationally indistinguishable from transcripts generated by the interaction between P and V.
We present a ZKPoK where, given a matrix A and a vector y, the prover is able to prove knowledge of vector s and e such that sA + e = y and e ∈ B n =ω . This protocol was proposed in [JKPT12] . The protocol is presented in Figure 2 .
Theorem 3 ([JKPT12]). (P, V)
xLPN is a complete, special sound and HVZK ZKPoK for the relation
The cheating probability of (P, V) xLPN is 2/3. This means that a cheating prover can still answer correctly for two possible values of the challenge ch. More precisely, as a consequence of being HVZK, if the prover knows the challenge beforehand, then it can cheat in the protocol. In this work, we use this property of (P, V) xLPN in the security proof of the commitment scheme of Section 3.
On the existence of trapdoors for codes
We present the Goppa Distinguisher (GD) problem, one of the assumptions that guarantee the security of the McEliece public-key encryption scheme [McE78] Prover P(A, y, s, e)
Figure 2: (P, V) xLPN scheme. Let A ∈ {0, 1} k×n , s ∈ {0, 1} k , e ∈ {0, 1} n such that e ∈ B n =ω and let y ∈ {0, 1} n such that sA + e = y. By C A we denote the code defined by A. Let S be the set of permutations of size n and let (Com, Ver) be a commitment scheme where Com is the commitment algorithm and Ver is the opening algorithm. and several code-based cryptosystems. This problem was firstly assumed to be hard in [CFS01] in the context of signature schemes.
Definition 4 (Goppa Distinguisher). Let n, k ∈ N such that k < n. Let Gop(n, k) be an algorithm that outputs a matrix defining a binary Goppa code of size n × k. The GD is ε-hard, if for every PPT algorithms D, we have
Although the problem can be solved for codes with high rate (that is, when k ≈ n) [FGUO + 11] , the GD problem is assume to be computationally hard in the general case, since the best known attack still has exponential runtime [LS01] .
The following lemma guarantees the existence of code-based trapdoors (also called decoding algorithms).
Lemma 5 ([CFS01]
). Let n, k, ω ∈ N such that k < n. There exists an algorithm GenTd H that receives as input n, k and ω and outputs a pair (H, td) where
(n−k)×n is a matrix and td is a trapdoor for H with the following properties:
• There is an algorithm Decode H that takes as input td and a word z ∈ {0, 1} n−k . It outputs either e, if z T = He T and w(e) ≤ ω, or a message error ⊥, otherwise;
• There is a non-negligible number of words z in {0, 1} n−k for which Decode H (z, td) does not output a message error ⊥;
• H is indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen matrix U from {0, 1}
(n−k)×n given that the GD problem is hard.
From this lemma, we can derive the following corollary. It states that, if we have a trapdoor for parity-check matrices, then we also have a trapdoor for generating matrices.
Corollary 6. Let n, k, ω ∈ N such that k < n. There exists an algorithm GenTd that receives as input n, k and ω and outputs a pair (A, td) where A ∈ {0, 1} k×n is a matrix and td is a trapdoor for A with the following properties:
• There is an algorithm Decode A that takes as input td and a word c ∈ {0, 1} n . It outputs either s, if c = sA + e for some s ∈ {0, 1} k and w(e) ≤ ω, or a message error ⊥, otherwise;
• There is a non-negligible number of words c in {0, 1} n for which Decode A (c, td) does not output a message error ⊥;
• A is indistinguishable from a uniformly chosen matrix U from {0, 1} k×n given that the GD problem is hard.
Proof. Let (H, td) ← GenTd H . Consider A to be the generating matrix associated with H. That is, consider A such that HA T = 0 and Decode A to be the algorithm that takes td and c as input and does the following:
2. It computes e = Decode H (td, y);
If e =⊥, it outputs ⊥;
4. Else, it outputs c = c − e .
Note that, if c is of the form sA + e, where e is a error vector, then Hc T = H(sA)
T + He T = He T , the Decode H algorithm outputs e and the procedure Decode A outputs c = sA. Else, if c is not of the form sA + e, then the procedure Decode A outputs an error message ⊥.
If there is a non-negligible number of words y ∈ {0, 1} n−k for which Decode H does not output a message error ⊥, then there is also a non-negligible number of words c ∈ {0, 1} n such that Decode A does not output a message error ⊥.
If H is indistinguishable from a uniform matrix in {0, 1} (n−k)×n , then A is also indistinguishable from a uniform matrix in {0, 1}
k×n . To see this, assume that we can distinguish A from a uniformly chosen matrix. Then we can construct a distinguisher algorithm for H, which contradicts the assumption.
Recently, a new code-based trapdoor function was presented in [DAST18] . It has the same properties as the one presented in Lemma 6. The only difference is that this trapdoor is not based on the GD assumption but rather on the hardness of distinguish generalized admissible codes (U, U + V) from uniformly chosen codes.
Observe that the construction of Section 3 works with any code-based trapdoor function fulfilling the conditions of Lemma 6. However, for simplicity, we explicitly use the trapdoor function of [CFS01] , based on the GD assumption. The reason for using trapdoor functions based on the GD assumption in our construction is that its security well-study (or, at least, it is more studied than other code-based distinguisher assumptions). We do not care about its efficiency, since the trapdoor is only used in the security proof, as long as it runs in polynomial time.
Let ω be the error decoding capability of the code defined by H. In order to be able to use the trapdoor in polynomial time, ω must be chosen well below the Gilbert-Varshamov bound [CFS01, DAST18] . Hence, 2ω is still much smaller than the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. In this work, we assume the hardness of the SD 2ω , where ω is the decoding capability of the code H, and which is widely assumed to be hard in the average-case [DAST18] .
UC-security and the Global random oracle model
The Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canneti [Can01] guarantees security of a protocol under arbitrary composition. Let π be a protocol and let F be an ideal functionality that implement the same cryptographic primitive. Let E be an environment that oversees both executions of the real-world protocol π and of the ideal-world functionality F. We say that π is secure if no environment can distinguish the real-world execution from the ideal-world execution.
The Global Random Oracle. The notion of a Global Random Oracle gRO was firstly introduced in [CJS14] . We present its definition as in [CJS14] . As mentioned in the introduction, the gRO is available to every party. However, contrarily to the ROM, the simulator will only be able to observe to adversarial queries, that is, queries made by an adversary. gRO functionality Parameters: a range D of size (κ) and a listF of ideal functionalities. Upon receiving a query x from a party P = (pid, sid) or from an adversary A do:
(κ) , store (x, v) in Q and return v to P.
• Parse x as (s, x ). If sid = s, add (s, x , v) to Q |sid .
Upon receiving a request from an ideal functionality in the listF, with SID sid, return the list Q |sid .
Let IDEAL F ,S,E denote the distribution of the output of the environment E after the ideal-world execution of F with adversary S and EXEC G gRO π,A,E denote the output of E after the real-world execution of π with adversary A where every party has access to the ideal functionality gRO. Security in the gRO-hybrid model is defined as follows.
Definition 7 ([CJS14])
. Let π be a protocol with n parties involved and an adversary A. We say that π UC-realizes F in the G gRO -hybrid model if for every PPT adversary A there is a PPT simulator S such that for all PPT environments E,
where F is an ideal functionality.
In this work, we consider only static malicious adversaries. That is, adversaries that may deviate in any arbitrary way from the protocol. However, parties involved in the protocol are corrupted before the beginning of the protocol and remain like that until the end.
Some remarks regarding the gRO. The gRO Model assumes the existence of a single global random oracle, available to every party. However, we remark that, from this single global random oracle (which outputs strings of a given size (κ)), we can create other global random oracles with the output size that we want. For example, if we want a global random oracle gRO with output size 2 (κ), we can define gRO (x) = (gRO(x)||gRO(x + 1)) where || is the concatenation of binary strings. Note that, since the output of gRO is completely random, then so it is the output of gRO . Throughout this work, the size of the output of gRO is specified in each case. When it is not explicit, then we consider the size of the output to be (κ).
The commitment ideal functionality. We present the ideal commitment functionality F tcom , as presented in [CJS14] .
F tcom functionality Commitment phase: Upon receiving (sid, commit, C, R, M ) from C, F tcom stores (sid, M ) and sends (sid, receipt, C, R) to R. It ignores future commit messages from C with the same sid.
Opening phase:
Upon receiving (sid, reveal, C, R) from C, F tcom checks whether it has recorded (sid, commit, C, R, M ). If so, returns (sid, reveal, C, Rs, M ) to R and halts.
When the adversary S asks for the list Q |sid , with session ID sid, F tcom obtains it from G gRO and sends it to S.
We define the security properties for a commitment scheme: binding and hiding properties. A binding commitment scheme is a scheme such that a commitment cannot be opened to two different messages. A hiding commitment scheme is a scheme that hides the message from the receiver. We say that a scheme is perfectly hiding if the former holds for any adversary (not necessarily running in polynomial time).
UC-commitment scheme
Consider two parties, a committer C and a receiver R. Suppose that C wants to commit to a message M of size λ.
Let (P ε , V ε ) xLPN , where
2 ) be the sigmaprotocol (P, V) xLPN repeated O(1/ε) in order to obtain a negligible soundness error of ε.
Public parameters. Let n, k, k , ω ∈ N such that n > k and n > k , B ∈ {0, 1} n×k be a public matrix uniformly chosen at random and let gRO be the ideal Global Random Oracle. Here, λ is the size of the message M .
Commitment phase. Both parties, the committer C and the receiver R, are activated by their inputs. They proceed as follows:
1. R generates (A, td) ← GenTd(n, k, ω). It chooses a random string u 1 and queries gRO on (sid, R, td, u 1 ) setting the output to y 1 . It sends (sid, A, y 1 ) to C.
2. Upon receiving (sid, A, y) from R, C it chooses r 1 ←$ {0, 1} k and r 2 ←$ {0, 1} k and two error vectors e 1 , e 2 ←$ B n =ω . It chooses a random string t 1 and queries gRO on (sid, C, M, t 1 ) setting the output to x 1 ∈ {0, 1} n . It computes c 1 = r 1 A + x 1 + e 1 .
Next, it queries gRO on (sid, C, r 1 , M, t 1 ), using the same random string t 1 , setting the output to x 2 ∈ {0, 1} k . It computes
It sends (sid, c 1 , c 2 ) to R.
A scheme can be found in Figure 3 . To open a message M , the parties proceed as follows.
1. R first chooses ch ← V ε 1 , consistent with the challenges from the (P ε , V ε ) xLPN protocol. It chooses a random string u 2 and queries gRO on (sid, R, ch, u 2 ) setting the output to y 2 . It sends (sid, y 2 ) to C.
2. Upon receiving (sid, y 2 ) from R, C computes com ← P ε 1 ((B, r 2 B + e 2 ) , r 2 ), a commitment of (P ε , V ε ) xLPN for public information (B, r 2 B + e 2 ) and secret information r 2 . It chooses a random string t 3 and queries (sid, C, com, r 2 B+ e 2 , t 3 ) to gRO setting the output to x 3 . It sends (sid, x 3 ) to R.
3. Upon receiving (sid, x 3 ) from C, R reveals td and ch by sending (sid, td, u 1 , ch, u 2 ) to C.
4. Upon receiving (sid, td, u 1 , ch, u 2 ) from R, C checks that the opening td, t 1 is consistent with y 1 and that ch, t 2 is consistent with y 2 . It does this by querying gRO on (sid, R, td, u 1 ) and on (sid, R, ch, u 2 ), setting the output to y 1 and to y 2 (respectively) and by checking if y 1 = y 1 and if y 2 = y 2 . If any of these tests fails, C aborts the protocol. Otherwise, it computes resp ← P ε 2 ((B, r 2 B + e 2 ) , r 2 ; com, ch) and sends (sid, r 1 , M, t 1 , t 3 , com, resp) to R. Upon receiving (sid, r 1 , M, t 1 , t 3 , com, resp) from C, R sets T = (com, ch, resp). It queries gRO on (sid, C, M, t 1 ) and on (sid, C, r 1 , M, t 1 ) and sets the output to x 1 and to x 2 respectively. It also queries gRO on (sid, com, c 2 − x 2 A, t 3 ) and sets the output to x 3 . It checks if x 3 = x 3 , if w(c 1 − (r 1 A + x 1 )) ≤ ω and if V ε 2 (c 2 − x 2 A, T ) = 1. If any of these tests fail, R outputs 0. Else, it accepts the opening and outputs 1.
A scheme of the opening phase is presented in Figure 4 .
Opening phase
(sid, td, ch)
Figure 4: Opening phase. The nonce t 1 , t 3 , u 1 and u 2 are omitted.
Security
In this section, we prove the security of the scheme. We also present the simulation required to guarantee universal composability.
Committer's and receiver's privacy
Let α be the size of the random string t 1 .
Theorem 8. Suppose that α = λ + n. The commitment scheme is perfectly hiding and computationally binding in the gRO-model, given that the SD 2ω and GD assumptions hold.
Proof. We begin by proving the hiding property. Then we prove the binding property for our scheme.
Perfectly hiding property. The commitment corresponds to c 1 = r 1 A + x 1 + e 1 and c 2 = x 2 A + r 2 B + e 2 , where x 1 ← gRO(sid, M, t 1 ) and x 2 ← gRO(sid, r 1 , M, t 2 ). This means that the message is hidden by the random oracle. We prove that the probability of an adversary to find M is negligible, even when it has unlimited computational power. To this end, we prove that, given an output y of gRO, the probability that the output of a query of the form (sid, C, M, t 1 ) is y is negligible for every message M and random t 1 , if the size of t 1 is equal to the size of M plus the size of y.
Let S y be the random variable that corresponds to the number of fixed size x such that y ← gRO(x), where x is of the form (sid, M, t) where M is a fixed message of size λ, t has size α and y has size n. We have that S y = t Ber t (2 n ) where Ber denotes a Bernoulli distribution for each t. Hence, the expected value of S y is E(S y ) = 2 α 2 −n . By the Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality (and considering the relative distance), we have
where γ is some constant. Consider δ to be 2 −α/4 , so that the distance between S y and E(S y ) is negligible.
Taking the union bound for every y and for every M , we get
By hypothesis, consider α = λ + n. We conclude that the relative distance between S y and E(S y ) is at most 1/2 (λ+β)/4 , except with negligible probability.
Binding property. Suppose that C is able to find c 1 and c 2 , given A and y 1 , such that it is able to open different messages. That is, C is able to interact with R following the opening phase of the protocol such that R accepts the opening for two different messages. This situation is sketched below:
where x 1 = gRO(sid, M, t 1 ), x 2 = gRO(sid, r 1 , M, t 1 ), x 1 = gRO(sid, M , t 1 ) and x 2 = gRO(sid, r 1 , M , t 1 ). Therefore, we have that (r 1 + r 1 )A + (e 1 + e 1 ) = x 1 + x 1 .
Let r 1 + r 1 =r, e 1 + e 1 =ẽ and x 1 + x 1 =x. Rewriting the equation, we havẽ rA +ẽ =x, wherex is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} n and w(ẽ) ≤ 2ω. By the SD 2ω , the probability that the receiver findsr andẽ for a randomx is negligible. Else, the receiver would be able to solve the SD 2ω for random instances.
Also, by the soundness of the (P ε , V ε ) xLPN protocol, we have
where x 2 ← gRO(r 1 , M, t 1 ), x 2 ← gRO(r 1 , M , t 1 ) and e 2 , e 2 ∈ B n =ω , except with negligible probability. This means that the word
has Hamming weight less or equal than 2ω. Let C A be the code defined by the generating matrix A and C B the code defined by B. By definition of C A , every c ∈ C A has Hamming weight greater than 2ω, otherwise we could not be able to some words of the form y = c+ẽ where c ∈ C A andẽ ∈ B n ω . Moreover, if d ∈ C B then d has Hamming weight greater than 2ω, except with negligible probability, by the Gilbert-Varshamov bound [MS77] . We conclude that x 2 + x 2 r 2 + r 2 = 0, except with negligible probability. Therefore, x 2 = x 2 and r 2 = r 2 , except with negligible probability. So, if it is infeasible to find collisions for gRO, then it is infeasible to open two different messages in the opening phase.
UC-security
In this section, we prove that the scheme is secure in the UC-framework.
Theorem 9. The commitment scheme presented securely UC-realizes F com against static malicious adversaries in the G gRO -hybrid model, given that the SD 2ω and GD assumptions hold.
Proof. Let A be an adversary in the real-world, S be an adversary in the idealworld, called the simulator, and E be any environment. As usual, the communication between A and E is simulated by S by forwarding messages from one party to the other. The trivial cases where the adversary corrupts both parties and when it does not corrupt any party can be simulated by S. When A corrupts both parties, S just runs A internally and let it generate all the messages. When A does not corrupt any party, S generates all the messages from C and R, following the protocol and forwarding every message to A.
We now show how to construct the simulator when A corrupts only one of the parties.
Simulation when only the committer C is corrupted by A. Here, S controls R and tries to extract C's input.
Commitment phase. The simulator S follows the protocol honestly by generating (A, td) ← GenTd(n, m, ω) and sending (sid, A, y 1 ) to C where y 1 is the output of gRO when queried on (sid, td, u 1 ).
Let Q |sid be the list of queries to gRO by any party with sid that does not pertain that session ID. Upon receiving (sid, c 1 , c 2 ), S checks if there are two queries of the form (sid, C, M, t 1 ) (with output x 1 ) and (sid, C, r 1 , M, t 1 ) such that w(c 1 + r 1 A + x 1 ) ≤ ω. If there is such a query and it is unique, S sets M = M . Else, it sets M = 0 λ .
The simulator S sends the message (sid, commit, C, R, M ) to F tcom .
Opening phase. The simulator S follows the protocol honestly, controlling R. If S accepts the opening of M * after interacting with C, S checks if M * = M . If so, it sends the message (sid, reveal, C, R) to F tcom . Else, it aborts the execution.
The ideal-world and real-world execution differ only when S aborts when it should not abort. This happens only if C is able to open a message M * different from the message M that S sends to F tcom . This may happen when:
1. There are no queries in Q |sid of the form (sid, C, M, t 1 ) and (sid, C, r 1 , M, t 1 ) that fulfill w(c 1 + r 1 A + x 1 ) ≤ ω, but S accepts the opening of C;
2. There are several queries in Q |sid of the form (sid, C, M, t 1 ) and (sid, C, r 1 , M, t 1 ) that fulfill w(c 1 + r 1 A + x 1 ) ≤ ω, but S accepts the opening of C;
3. There are such queries and they are unique, but C opens a different M * than M .
The probability of the event in 1 is negligible, since C would have to find an opening that fulfill w(c 1 + r 1 A + x 1 ) ≤ ω. As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 8, this happens with negligible probability for PPT algorithms. The probability of the event in 2 is also negligible, by the proof of the previous theorem. The third event happens with negligible probability by the binding property of the scheme.
We conclude that both executions are indistinguishable from the point-ofview of E, except with negligible probability. Hence, the protocol is secure in the UC-framework against a corrupted C.
Simulation when only the receiver R is corrupted by A. Here, S controls C and commits to a message (for example 0 λ ). After receiving a message from the ideal functionality, S has to open the received message to R. This process is usually called equivocation.
Commitment phase. Upon receiving a message (sid, receipt, C, R) from F tcom , S follows the protocol honestly committing to the message 0 λ , for example. That is, upon receiving A and y 1 from R, it computes c 1 = r 1 A + x 1 + e 1 and c 2 = x 2 A + r 2 B + e 2 , where x 1 ← gRO(sid, C, 0 λ , t 1 ) and x 2 ← gRO(sid, C, r 1 , 0 λ , t 1 ), and sends (sid, c 1 , c 2 ) to R.
Opening phase. Upon receiving a message (sid, reveal, C, R, M ) from F tcom , S asks the list Q |sid from F tcom to gRO. It checks if there is a query whose output is equal to y 1 . If there is such a query, let us say (sid, R, td, u 1 ), and if td is a trapdoor for A, it sets td = td. Else, it sets td =⊥.
If td =⊥, it sets x 1 ← gRO(sid, C, M, t 1 ), where t 1 is a random string, and finds r 1 such that r 1 A + e 1 = c 1 + x 1 using td . If this fails, it chooses another random string t 1 and tries again. it repeats the process until it is successful. Observe that this task can be done in polynomial time by Corollary 6.
Upon receiving (sid, y 2 ) from R, S checks if there is a query of the form (sid, R, w, u 2 ) in Q |sid such that its output is y 2 . If there is, it sets ch = w, else it chooses ch ← V ε 1 . It computes com for public information (B,c 2 ) wherec 2 = c 2 + x 2 A and x 2 ← gRO(sid, C, r 1 , M, t 1 ) such that it can create valid transcripts (with challenge ch ), even without knowing the secret. Observe that, since the cheating probability of a dishonest prover in (P ε , V ε ) xLPN is 2/3, then S can always find such com. It queries gRO on x 3 ← (sid, C,c 2 , com). If S was not able to find r 1 (because td =⊥) then, it chooses x 3 at random. It sends (sid, x 3 ) to R.
Upon receiving (sid, td, u 1 , ch, u 2 ) from R, S checks if ch = ch . If not, then it aborts the protocol. If td =⊥, S follows the protocol as the honest C would do from this point on. Else if td =⊥, it chooses random values for r 1 , t 1 , t 3 and sends them (together with M, com, resp) as the opening.
The real-world and the ideal-world executions differ only when: 1. S is not able to extract a valid trapdoor for matrix A and R sends td such that it is a valid trapdoor for A and its output by gRO is y 1 . In this case, S has a negligible probability of completing the protocol with a valid opening for M ; 2. S aborts when ch = ch .
The probability of S accepting the opening of td as a valid one is negligible since it is the probability of R finding collisions for gRO. Hence, S (controlling C) will abort the execution before sending the last message (corresponding to the opening of r 1 , M , t 1 , t 3 , com and resp), except with negligible probability. Moreover, the probability of the event 2 happening is also negligible, by the gRO assumption.
We conclude that both executions are indistinguishable from the point-ofview of E, except with negligible probability. Hence, the protocol is secure in the UC-framework against a corrupted R.
Conclusion
We proposed the first ever post-quantum UC-commitment scheme in the global random oracle. The security of our proposal is based on the Syndrome Decoding and on the Goppa Distinguisher assumptions, two well-established assumptions in post-quantum cryptography.
Our proposal is proven to be perfectly hiding, meaning that even an allpowerful receiver is not able to find the message that the committer is committing to, before the opening phase, and (computationally) binding.
The scheme is proven secure in the UC-framework against static malicious adversaries. However, a closer look at the protocol reveals that we cannot prove security against adaptive malicious adversaries, that is, adversaries that may corrupt parties at any point of the protocol. In particular, the scheme cannot be proven secure against a committer that is corrupted adaptively at the end of the commitment phase, since the simulator does not have a trapdoor for the matrix B.
We leave as future work to develop a post-quantum UC-commitment scheme secure against adaptive malicious adversaries.
